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ABSTRACT 
Importance of International Humanitarian Law has emerged significantly in last two decades, 
becoming as the primary legal source, which is used as the pre-emptive measure of restricting 
international actors from indiscriminate actions and use of prohibited weapons with regulating 
the entire conduct of war. Saudi-led intervention in Yemen has become a vivid example of 
how the well-established legal rules can become irrelevant, because of the wrong approach, 
that was taken by respective parties to serve its political interests, while neglecting its legal 
obligations. Despite the emerged conflict of interests between the law and politics, 
International Humanitarian Law concerning Yemen conflict has remained as the supreme 
legal framework that can explain unlawfulness of conducted violations of the acting party. 
The paper discusses the applicability of International Humanitarian Law  in the case of 
Yemen, especially the nature of alleged violations, by determining unlawfulness of conducted 
actions. 
Keywords: International humanitarian law, Yemen, Saudi-Led coalition, non-international 
armed conflict, alleged violations, unlawfulness.  
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SUMMARY 
The bachelor thesis “Intervention in Yemen in 2015: Assessing the alleged violations of 
International Humanitarian Law by Saudi-Led Coalition In Yemen conflict” is an analysis of 
alleged violations of international humanitarian law together with the assessment of the 
applicability of international humanitarian law rules in non-international armed conflict, 
namely Yemen conflict. The thesis analyses the subject of the unlawfulness of actions 
performed by Saudi-led coalition after its intervention in Yemen in 2015 basis on the 
assessment of two aspects of international humanitarian law: indiscriminate attacks and use of 
indiscriminate weapons, such as cluster munitions. Author focus its analysis on the 
examination of reviewing principles and norms of international humanitarian law, as well 
defining applicable legal rules of the treaty and customary law to the particular type of 
conflict, and applicability of respective limitations to the violent conducts related to the 
indiscriminate attacks and use of indiscriminate weapons by the chosen party. Thus, the 
author seeks to explain legal issues that arise in approaching different situations with different 
factual background, in order to affirm or reject the unlawfulness of conducted actions. The 
thesis is focused on the approaching legal sources of international humanitarian law 
applicable to non-international armed conflict, notably, the relevant treaty law, including 
common article 3 to four Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II related to non-
international armed conflicts,  customary international humanitarian law rules related to the 
indiscriminate attacks and indiscriminate weapons, and case-law practice, which is used to fill 
the gaps in the treaty and customary law with the analysis of two aspects and for practical 
application in situations, where violent actions were evidenced. Furthermore, the thesis covers 
the analysis of linkage of violations of international humanitarian law with the political issues 
related to the Yemen conflict. The thesis is divided into three parts: 
Part one provides with an analysis of the preliminary matters on the Yemen conflict both from 
political and legal sides. From the political side, it covers the historical background of the 
emergence of Yemen conflict by defining main events that have brought to the current 
situation in the country. From the legal perspective chapter analyses belonging of Yemen 
conflict to the non-international armed type of conflict by covering pertinent legal criteria that 
indicate on that. In this regard, the classification of the conflict is used for the determination 
of the applicable law for the analysis of situations, where indiscriminate attacks and the use of 
indiscriminate weapons were used. For the detailed examination of indiscriminate attacks and 
indiscriminate weapons, such as cluster munitions, the author analyses their legal status under 
the international humanitarian law.  
In part two, the author analyses different situations on the subject of the unlawfulness of 
specific actions, conducted by the Saudi-led coalition basis on the law, that applies to non-
international armed conflicts. Cases have been chosen base on the different nature of conducts 
that led to the separate application of legal rules and structure of legal analysis itself.  
Part three addresses the analysis of the subject of political relation towards violations of 
international humanitarian law by making thoughts to how the existence of breaches may 
result in the political resolution of the conflict.   
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In conclusion, the author seeks to summarize made considerations in the thesis with affirming 
or rejecting the hypothesis and give recommendations regarding prevailing circumstances 
with violations of international humanitarian law in Yemen conflict.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Actuality 
“Before we talk about peace, we must talk about war”.1 
Modern world is changing very rapidly, looking from different projections prepending 
uncertainty and blindness before the next generations. Political agenda on the Middle East de-
facto for a long time remained unstable in attempts to change the situation, dispose of the 
critical matter with relation to the conflicts, however, the international legal norms and rules 
have always remained as the stable source that has recommended itself as the way that can 
stop conflicting parties from escalation and increasing violence towards the civilian 
population. In this matter, the case of Yemen is the crucial one, because it shows the opposite, 
how the legal norms can be neglected and to what extent it results in violent situations. 
Since the moment, when Saudi-led intervention in Yemen took place on 26 March 
2015,
2
 the coalition has commenced a large number of attacks against civilian population 
through airstrikes that were used to enhance military capabilities of the advancing side in the 
face of Yemen's government, as well as create dominance in the air and on the ground 
combat.
3
 Main military objectives of the Saudi-led coalition was to ensure that, firstly, 
restoration of the legitimacy of the official government of Yemen will come true, secondly, 
particularly for the Saudi-Arabia it was the question of defending national security near its 
borders, and thirdly, restore the staus-quo in the strategic region to protect states of coalition 
interests. All these considerations seem to have a positive note, but, in reality, the 
implementation of plans ended up to create one of the most massive humanitarian disasters in 
the modern history of humanity.
4
 The current situation in Yemen is as it is, saying that a 
considerable amount of factors had affected the situation in the country. One of such factors is 
non-compliance with international legal rules, which are regulating the conduct of hostilities. 
Since the Yemen conflict has commenced, there have been a significant amount of allegations 
of violations by the different parties to the conflict on entirely other matters related to the law 
on armed conflict. Those received the wide “popularity” from foreign governments and 
NGO’s to count Yemen as the humanitarian disaster. For instance, such are the use of child 
soldiers, arbitrary killings and detentions, torture, naval blockade, and others. However, the 
most often occurred, one of the gravest and inexplicable in terms of motive actions are the 
holding of the indiscriminate attacks and the use of indiscriminate weapons by Saudi-led 
coalition in Yemen conflict that have not been highlighted to a large extent, except 
observations of NGO’s and independent experts. A lot of people, including governmental 
authorities simply do not go into the specifics of what has happened in Yemen and how 
matter can be clearly explained reasonably from a legal perspective. 
                                                          
1
 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Yemen: Before we talk about peace, we must talk about 
war", Available on https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-we-talk-about-peace-we-must-first-talk-about-war, 
Accessed on April 02, 2020. 
2
 May Darwich, The Saudi Internvention in Yemen: Struggling for Status, p.125. Available on: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26390311?seq=1, Accessed on 
 
 April 03, 2020. 
3
Zachary, Laub and Kali, Robinson, Yemen in Crisis. Available on: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-
crisis, April 03, 2020.
   
4 
 International Rescue Committee,  “Why is Yemen the world's worst humanitarian crisis? Available on: 
https://www.rescue.org/article/why-yemen-worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis, April 03, 2020.  
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Objectives 
The thesis is aimed to make more transparency on what has happened in the Yemen conflict 
concerning holding indiscriminate attacks and use of indiscriminate weapons by Saudi-led 
coalition, together with the matter how the legal and political approaches deals and explains 
implemented methods. The bachelor thesis has a vital goal to demonstrate the applicability of 
international humanitarian law ( hereinafter" IHL") rules in the non-international armed 
conflict (hereinafter “NIAC”), notably Yemen conflict, and how rules can explain 
unlawfulness of the indiscriminating disproportionate attacks directed against civilians and 
civilian objects, and the use of internationally banned cluster munitions by Saudi-led coalition 
by observing specific situations, where the implementation of above-mentioned methods of 
conduct were evidenced. The paper addresses analysis of alleged violations of IHL with 
reviewing and defining applicable legal norms, including mainly Customary International 
Humanitarian Law rules (hereinafter “СIHL”). 
The analysis is aimed to answer on the following research question: how the 
applicable laws to non-international armed conflict explain the illegality of the use of 
indiscriminate strikes and indiscriminate weapons, such as cluster munitions by Saudi-led 
coalition in the Yemen conflict? It is hypothesised that applicable law to non-international 
armed conflict explains the unlawfulness of conduct of Saudi Coalition in Yemen through an 
assessment of alleged violations of law that occurred after using indiscriminate attacks 
towards the civilian population and civilian objects, and use of cluster munitions. Additional 
sub-question is:  can the alleged violations of IHL act as a tool for an excuse towards a 
political resolution of the conflict in Yemen? It is hypothesised that alleged violations of IHL 
cannot act as a tool for an excuse towards a political resolution of the conflict in Yemen. 
The thesis is restricted not only to mainstream unlawfulness of the alleged violations 
from a legal perspective with analysing situations, which acts as the evidence but also to 
elaborate on the role of certain types of methods of military conduct, such as indiscriminate 
attacks and use of indiscriminate weapons. Paper stresses on the explanation of the legal 
nature of armed conflict in Yemen by affirming its affiliation with non-international armed 
conflict. Additionally, analysis is aimed to reveal how the alleged violations of the law can be 
connected to the political elements of the conflict with underlying the impact and role of 
alleged violations on the topicality of conflict resolution in Yemen. 
Methods 
To analyse the specific situations, where the violations were evidenced, it is important to 
describe the methodology, sources and tools that are used in analysis. The legal part of the 
paper specifies analysis on the two specific types of violations, namely, indiscriminate attacks 
on the civilians and use of prohibited weapons, such as cluster munitions weapons. Therefore, 
concerning applicable law and legal sources, which are used in the thesis to substantiate 
violations legally, concentrates primarily on the application of CIHL rules related to three 
“chapters”. First is the principle of distinction, which covers primary rules used in the 
analysis, these are rules 1 and 7 related to the distinction between civilians and combatants, 
and civilian objects and military objects respectively. Furthermore, rules 1, 8, 9, 11, 12, 21 
that defines respective actors and tools (e.g. civilians, civilian objects, indiscriminate attacks 
etc.) are mentioned and analysed in the paper respectively. Second is Weapons(under 
CIHL), and following rule 71 related to use weapons that are in nature indiscriminate, in case 
9 
 
of Yemen, those are cluster munitions weapons used by coalition. Third is Treatment of the 
Civilians [and persons hors de combat (those are not covered in paper)], by covering rule 89, 
which is related to Violence to life. Additionally, Additional Protocol II, related to non-
international armed conflicts, is used by covering analysis of Article 13 related to the 
protection of the civilian population. Common article 3, to Geneva Conventions, is used to 
define non-international armed conflict substantive nature under the law.  IHL doctrines and 
principles, which are core for explaining related types of violations that are covered, are the 
following: the distinction between civilians and combatants; the principle of proportionality; 
principle of precautions.  
The author relies on the reports and reviews of the international and non-governmental 
organisations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Bellingcat, The National 
Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations to Human Rights,
5 United Nations, and 
sources from the ground.
6
  
Structure 
The structure of the paper is divided into three chapters; each of them covers a relevant part of 
the analysis. The first chapter refers to the historical and “legal” background of the conflict, 
which points out preliminary matters of the Yemen conflict with underlying main events, 
which have occurred before and during the Saudi intervention in Yemen. Chapter approaches 
main facts related to the political situation in the country, setting the basis for the further 
analysis of conflict for legal perspective and analysis related to the further possible political 
developments. Also, the chapter addresses Yemen conflict from a legal perspective, namely, 
explaining the nature of the conflict by explaining its belonging to internationalized non-
international armed conflict, in order to define relevant applicable law in terms of assessment 
of unlawfulness of actions further. Therefore, the chapter addresses definitions of 
indiscriminate attacks and cluster munitions weapons from the perspective of IHL, which are 
used in the analysis of situations in the second chapter. The second chapter covers assessment 
of violations of IHL by approaching events, where alleged violations of law were 
documented, and demonstrating unlawfulness of the conduct of coalition basis on the analysis 
of the relevant applicable law related to indiscriminate attacks and use of cluster munitions. 
The third chapter relates to the author's findings and proposals on the idea of using IHL 
violations as an excuse towards political dialogue for Yemen, by explaining regional political 
agenda together with the idea that IHL violations can act as the corollary to the cooperation 
between opposing sides. Finally, the conclusion is aimed to answer the set research question 
and give recommendations on the chosen topic to the further analysis of the Yemen conflict 
both from a legal and political perspective.  
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Body, which is set by the government of the Republic of Yemen to investigate on alleged violations of Human 
Rights and International Humanitarian Law. 
6
 Sources from the ground are defined as witnesses, observers or victims of alleged crime with whom interviews 
by NGO’s had been taken. 
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1. PRINCIPAL MATTERS ON POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
OF THE YEMEN CONFLICT 
The current chapter refers to the discussion, explanation and evaluation being as the 
preliminary and descriptive part of the research that is aimed to deeply involve the reader into 
state of the art about the history and conflict legal framework to build a basis for a 
continuation of analysing unlawfulness of certain conducts and considerations referred to 
political element. Firstly, the chapter characterizes main historical events referred to the 
political situation in the country by underlying the conflict itself, the role of Houthis, Saudi 
Intervention and emergence of a humanitarian crisis that took place in 2015.
7
 Secondly, 
chapter analyses legal status of the conflict by approaching its “commitment” to 
internationalized non-international armed conflict with the assessment of several legal issues, 
which rise concerning the particular type of conflict, hence, such approach, is taken to 
determine the applicable law in approaching unlawfulness of actions in the second chapter. 
Furthermore, a chapter legally defines military “concepts” such as indiscriminate attacks and 
cluster munitions under IHL. 
1.1. Political background and considerations 
It is essential to point out that Yemen has been in a permanent status of war since 1962, due to 
the lack of institutional capacity and fragmentation of government with emerging political and 
military organisations, such as Houthis and terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, to efficiently 
manage with the internal political situation that has occurred and has led to the humanitarian 
crisis.
8
The real explanation of what happened in Yemen needs a more detailed approach. The 
history of Modern Yemen can be divided into two pillars: First, before the intervention took 
place in 2015, which covers events related to events prior and during Arab Spring, and second 
after the intervention was conducted in 2015. 
1.1.1. Situation before intervention 
Modern Yemen before being unified in 1990,
9
 has been strictly divided country into two 
respective states, first, so-called Yemen Arab Republic (hereinafter “YAR”) ruled by 
Abdullah as Saleh,
10
 second, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen(hereinafter 
“PDRY), ruled by Qahtan al Shaabi,11 independency of which was proclaimed in 1967 after 
the British forces withdrew from the city of Aden.
12
 YAR was successful in managing the 
diplomatic environment, significantly supported by Egypt and opposed by Saudi-Arabia and 
                                                          
7
 Dan Roberts and Kareem Shaheen. Saudi Arabia launches Yemen airstrikes as alliance builds against Houthi 
rebels., available on: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/saudi-arabia-begins-airstrikes-against-
houthi-in-yemen. Accessed on March 11, 2020. 
8
 Jeremy M.Sharp, “Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention”, Congressional Research Service (2019): p.1. 
Available on: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf,  Accessed on March 12, 2020. 
9
 Charles Dunbar, “The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics and Prospects”, Middle East Journal 46(3) 
(1992): p.456. 
10
 Faisal Eldros. Yemen: Who was Ali Abdullah Saleh? Available on: 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/yemen/2011/02/201122812118938648.html, Accessed on March 
14, 2020. 
11
 Robert Serjean, “South Arabia” in Historical Dictionary of Yemen, ed. Robert D. Burrowes (Metuchen, New 
Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 2009), p.348. 
12
 Ian Proctor. Why Did British Forces Leave Aden? Available on: https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/why-did-
british-troops-leave-aden. Accessed on March 15, 2020. 
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Jordan.
13
 On the other side, PDRY had demonstrated itself as the satellite of the Soviet Union 
with the prevalence of the communist ideology.
14
  After the unification was declared on 22 
May 1990
15
 with the joint constitution being drafted and ratified in 1991
16
, the president of 
the "new" Republic of Yemen became the former Northern Yemen leader Ali Abdullah Saleh, 
on the other side the head of government Ali Salim al-Beidh, who was the former Southern 
Yemen leader.
17
 It could be considered that both Southern and Northern Yemen states were 
forced to seek for opportunities for a dialogue, to economically benefit from the extraction of 
natural resources, have the joint government, hence, prevalent policies, due to importance of 
Yemen's geopolitical position in the region. 
In 2004 situation has changed, when the new actor has "acceded" in state of the art in 
the face of Houthis, which was internal Zaydi-Shia movement established by dissident cleric 
Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi.
18
 Eventually, the movement had launched an insurgency 
against the Yemen government, which took large scale even after the Saudi-led intervention 
in 2015 and continues till present day.
19
 Since the Arab Spring uprisings evolved in 2011 in 
Yemen, its included streets protests and desire of formal and informal opposition factions to 
change the elites, that were ruling the country, especially, the Saleh.
20
 Despite the 
circumstances, which included the rise of the Houthi as an independent political fraction, that 
became capable of proposing its interests in the country, in 2011 it was not clear that Houthis 
will regain power in Yemen further on in 2015, that became main motive to begin the 
intervention.
21
 The momentous event during the Arab Spring in Yemen was connected to the 
agreement, which was proposed by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), to transfer power from 
Saleh to Abbrabuh Mansur Hadi, draft a new constitution and conduct free and fair elections. 
Saleh has accepted the deal but has not signed it, due to existing "loopholes" in the 
agreement.
22
 Consequently, the transition of power has been done with the support of 
UNSC,
23
 however, the most violent events came further. In September 2014, the Houthis 
managed to seize the Capital of Yemen – the city of Sana after the decision of the 
governments that were aimed to cut the subsidies on the fuel.
24
 Coincidentally, the Hadi itself 
                                                          
13
 Robert D. Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development 1962-1986, (Milton Park, 
Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge,2017), pp. 75-82. 
14
 Anahi Alviso-Marino, “Impact of Transnational Experiences: The Case of Yemeni Artists in the Soviet 
Union”, International Journal of Archaeology and Social Sciences in the Arabian Peninsula(2013): p.4, 
Accessed March 15, 2020, https://doi.org/10.4000/cy.2229 
15
 Dunbar, supra note 9. 
16
 Constitutional history of Yemen. Available on: http://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-yemen, 
Accessed on March 15, 2020. 
17
 Al Jazeera. Yemen: The North-South Divide, available on: 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2017/11/yemen-north-south-divide-
171129152948234.html. Accessed on March 19, 2020. 
18
 Farhad Rezaei, Iran’s Foreign Policy After the Nuclear Agreement,  (Kings Cross London: Palgrave 
Macmillan(2019), p.165.  
19
 Christopher Boucek, Yemen on the Brink, (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, 2010), p.5. 
20
 BBC. Yemen Country Profile. Available on: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14704852, 
Accessed on March 16, 2020. 
21
 Counter extremism project. Houthis. Available on: https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/houthis, 
Accessed on March 16, 2020. 
22
 Luca Ferro, and Tom Ruys, “The Saudi-led Military Intervention in Yemen’s Civil War - 2015.” In The Use of 
Force in International Law : a Case-based Approach, ed. Tom Ruys,et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018), p.899. 
23
 The Guardian. UN security council passes resolution demanding Yemen rebels give up power. Available on: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/16/un-security-council-passes-resolution-demanding-yemen-
rebels-give-up-power, Accessed on March 16, 2020. 
24
 Ferro and Ruys, supra note 22.  
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and his government were put under arrest. However, Hadi and his government have managed 
to escape from the detention, and in result have rescinded his unlawful resignation, and has 
requested foreign support under the GCC on March 24, 2015.
25
 The following events are 
known as the beginning of the campaign of Saudi coalition against the Houthi rebels, which 
has led to unforeseen consequences in the face of alleged violations of IHL specifically. 
1.1.2. Intervention by Saudi-led Coalition 
After the request for the military support from the president Hadi was sent to states of GCC, 
after two days, the operation “Decisive Storm” has been launched on March 26, 2015, under 
the official statement to protect the legitimate government of Yemen and people of Yemen, 
that was subject to illegitimate coup d'état performed by the Houthis.26 The operation has 
been launched mainly by Saudi Arabia and several Gulf States such as UAE, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, etc. with the military and financial support from the United States and the United 
Kingdom.
27
 The operation has started successfully. Hence, Saudi Arabia affirmed that the set 
objectives of the operation had been achieved so far and on 22 April 2015, the new operation 
called "Renewal of Hope" has started.
28
 Unfortunately, it continues till the present day with 
long-term uncertainty concerning the prevailing circumstances, including the emergence of 
the humanitarian crisis, aggressive actions in the face of rocket attacks done by Houthis 
towards Saudi Arabia and UAE and its cities, airports and particularly its refineries. It resulted 
in an underestimation of opponent that has proved to be effective military and political force 
comparing to the strongest armies in the Gulf region. It can be concluded that intervention 
gave rise only to “supporting” instability, therefore from the perspective of international 
relations it has made Yemen as the place, where the conflict of interests of regional players, 
such as Iran, which supports Houthis, and Saudi-Arabia that stood for the restoration of the 
legitimate government of Yemen are confronted. An indirect confrontation of two major 
regional players has resulted in a crisis that does not have real solutions, due to the lack of 
instruments for cooperation and a great differentiation in political interests.  
Humanitarian Crisis 
Intervention by the Saudi-led coalition has resulted in the emergence of the humanitarian 
crisis, which reflected in nature in violations of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law. Alongside with political fragmentation of the country due to 
organized military uprising took place, Yemen has suffered from actions and methods of 
warfare that government forces together with coalition forces, have employed against the 
Houthi separatists. Despite the attempts from international organisations, such as UN, to 
compel belligerents to the conflict to halt military operations, to allow humanitarian aid to be 
provided for affected people, in reality, support has not been provided suitably due to existing 
obstacles, specifically, the methods of warfare, conducted by coalition. Here reference may be 
done to the actual concept described in this research – airstrikes and indiscriminate attacks: 
                                                          
25
 Ibid.  
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
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In August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition bombed and destroyed the main bridge 
between Hodeida and Sana’a. An estimated 90 per cent of food supplies provided by 
the UN’s World Food Programme had previously transited the destroyed bridge.29 
The humanitarian situation is not only about the lack of essential drugs and food to be 
provided for civilians need, but it is also about the extent of violence, that has crossed the red 
line in Yemen in a significant way. It has been estimated that on December 2018, the Saudi 
coalition launched 18,000 airstrikes,
30
 when the one-third of which have hit non-military 
targets.
31
 Moreover, the UN has estimated, that over 10,000 civilians were killed and around 
40,000 were injured during the conflict due to inappropriate methods used to conduct 
warfare.
32
  
ACLED estimates that around 56,000 civilians and combatants were killed between 
January 2016 and October 2018, with an increase of more than 2,000 per month, and 
an expected 70,000 to 80,000 dead once research backdating casualties to the start of 
the war in March 2015 is completed.
33 
Different sources have different numbers, but the only thing which should be taken in 
consideration that numbers of people, who have suffered from the conflict circumstances, are 
dramatically increasing and the effective way to stop such violence should be found.  
1.1.3. Summary 
The objective of sub-chapters mentioned above was to disclose the origins of the conflict to 
the reader, the time-line, which is quite essential.  Moving on to the linear analysis, the origins 
before the actual framework of the topic are quite incomprehensible. It can be assumed that 
due to such violent nature of events, which Yemen was subject for in its history, the violations 
of law found them as foreseeable. The next chapter discusses the nature of the existing 
conflict in Yemen from a legal perspective, in order to understand applicable law, which is 
crucial for the determination of legal substantiation of alleged violations of IHL.  
1.2. Legal analysis of the conflict and definitions of military methods  
Before turning to the direct legal analysis about the violations that have been conducted by 
Saudi coalition in the conflict, it is relevant to define the legal basis that is crucial in 
approaching violations. Since the IHL is the law, which determines rules of how the armed 
conflict should be regulated, and, because there is a considerable amount of legal sources that 
are related to IHL, when it turns to research violations, it is essential to firstly, identify the 
type of conflict, and only then identify particular rules, which are suited to the chosen type of 
conflict. Even though an explanation of violations in Yemen conflict by Saudi coalition 
mainly falls under CIHL, the specific legal sources should be observed, because in 
approaching violations of IHL there can be substantive differentiation in understanding the 
scope of application of legal rules to the particular type of conflict. After all, if a specific 
                                                          
29
 Tristan Dunning, “Yemen - the 'worst humanitarian crisis in the world' continues”, University of 
Queensland(2018), p.3. Available on: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329544463_Yemen__the_%27worst_humanitarian_crisis_in_the_worl
d%27_continues, Accessed on March 20, 2020. 
30
 Ibid. p.1. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid, p.7. 
33
 Ibid. 
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situation falls under the concrete type of conflict, it will lead to the specific application of the 
law on armed conflict, respectively. 
Since the laws on the armed conflict were established before the term of NIAC was 
“established” in Additional Protocol II to Geneva Conventions in June 1977,34 although 
internationally recognized treaties, documents, and ad hoc tribunals, unfortunately, had not 
determined the proper definition of NIAC that actually can be applied for cases, where alleged 
violations of law took place. Therefore, it is vital to elaborate on it, because, firstly, the issue 
of the distinction between NIAC and IAC types of conflict from a legal perspective has raised 
new term of "internationalized NIAC". It covers the subject of the foreign intervention that 
takes place in support of state party or non-state party in the internal conflict, and which is 
directly evidenced in Yemen. Secondly, what law should be applied in case there are de-facto 
two types of conflicts? It is crucial to observe the conditions for the application of legal rules 
to the conflict, when internationalized NIAC took place together with NIAC. Furthermore, 
following subchapters observe two legal sources that specify the definition of NIAC, hence - 
Internationalized NIAC. First is Common Article 3 to Geneva Conventions (hereinafter 
“CA3”), and Additional Protocol II to Geneva Conventions (hereinafter “APII”). Since the 
CA3 is considered as the principal legal source of determination of the NIAC and acts as the 
general principle of IHL, APII supplements it respectively. By observing these legal sources, 
it can be explained, what applicable law is relevant for the type of conflict existing in Yemen, 
and, how is it possible to determine conducted violations as unlawful actions in a particular 
type of conflict, which Yemen conflict fall under given considerations. Therefore, fact, which 
must be taken into account is, that Yemen and coalition states, which are Saudi-Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, as well as Qatar and Sudan 
in the first phase of intervention are parties to the APII related to the protection of victims in 
NIAC and CA3 to all Geneva Conventions. All parties are bound by the rules of respective 
Protocol and CA3, which is partially used as the applicable law in further research.
35
 
Moreover, states to the coalition and its forces are bound by customary rules that are 
considered as the general principles of law, and which derive from practice accepted by the 
law, indeed, these rules are used as the principal legal source for explaining unlawfulness of 
acts in analysed situations.   
The following subchapters define Yemen conflict from a legal point of view, 
underlying, firstly the type of conflict, which Yemen conflict is applied to. Next step 
addresses the threshold of armed conflict, and does the Yemen conflict meet such threshold 
with pointing out applicable law in the face of CA3 to Geneva Conventions and APII. 
Therefore, the chapter defines the term of indiscriminate attacks, and the use of cluster 
munitions under IHL and related legal sources.  
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1.2.1. Classification of the Yemen conflict as NIAC 
Firstly, it is important to define what NIAC is and explain why the Yemen conflict is likely to 
be considered as NIAC basis on the subsequent legal considerations. It should be said that 
drafters of the Geneva Conventions, possibly, did not think that implementation of certain 
rules of the Conventions, such as CA3, will be used extensively and become a subject of 
different legal disputes and various interpretations. Drafters have not clearly defined NIAC in 
CA3 provision, leaving behind the simple definition of it, which legally raises certain issues 
to be discussed: 
the armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties.
36
  
By comparing such interpretation with Common Article 2 to Geneva Conventions, related to 
IAC
37
, above-mentioned provision of CA3 deals with expression that outlines NIAC as the 
armed conflict, which is “not of international character”. It goes contrary to CA2, referred to 
IAC, which states that application of the Geneva Conventions takes place when there is 
declared war or any other armed conflict, which arise between two or more States.
38
 
Consequently, it can be said that NIAC practically applies to the hostilities, that are waged 
between government forces and one or more organized armed groups, and also between 
armed groups internally in the state.
39
 In Tadic case International Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia (hereinafter ”ICTY”) has interpreted context of the existence of armed conflict, 
specifically NIAC in second part of the provision. It exists when, 
there is a ...protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups within a State.
40
 
The basis on the historical background of Yemen conflict, it clearly defines that violence in 
Yemen take place between the official government of Hadi and the opposing party to his 
government - the Supreme Political Council (hereinafter “SPC”), which are considered as the 
non-state actor that launched an uprising in 2011 during the Arab Spring events. Therefore, 
the hostilities take place on the territory of the High Contracting party – Yemen. It is pertinent 
also to clarify why SPC, including Houthi are considered as the non-state actor in Yemen 
conflict, because this circumstance is crucial in determining presence of NIAC. Firstly, SPC is 
not internationally recognized government by UN and any other civilized nations or 
organisations. Secondly, SPC is directly opposing officially recognized government of Yemen 
by the military means, and have capacity to influence the state of art internally by dictating its 
own policies. Thirdly, SPC is an organized political actor, which is not directly connected to 
state, but is confronting state vital interests by continuing destabilizing internal situation in the 
country. 
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From this point, it can be said that the Yemen conflict can be defined as NIAC relying on the 
basic interpretation of CA3 and court considerations derived from Tadic judgement. However, 
the approach is not simple as it looks like, because, the factor of foreign intervention should 
be taken in consideration, when the case is applied to the particular type of conflict; and, 
certain clarification of legal circumstances must be defined.  
Legal effect of foreign intervention to the status of conflict is the next step, which is 
crucial in explaining the nature of Yemen conflict. From a theoretical point of view, the 
approach of Internationalized NIAC has absolute value than the approach of NIAC, because 
the CA3 and APII cover the traditional criteria set to determine applicable law for NIAC; 
however, the determination of applicable law to Internationalized NIAC should be done based 
on the observation of confronting parties. In order to avoid doubts in the analysis, the author 
uses the approach established by International Committee of the Red Cross ( hereinafter 
“ICRC”), which is called "fragmented approach" to determine applicable law in terms of 
Internationalized NIAC.
41
 The fragmented approach includes the determination of applicable 
law basis on the nature of bilateral relationships of belligerents separately together with 
consideration of the facts that occur on the ground of the conflict.
42
 In other words, as per 
CA3, if the hostilities are going between non-state party and the state party, the bilateral 
relationships in armed conflict are regulated by the law of NIAC, because the law of NIAC 
explains rules of confrontation between state and non-state actors.
43
 On the other hand, the 
law of IAC regulates bilateral relationships between two State parties, which are in a military 
confrontation, and where non-state armed group is not involved as the party.
44
 Accordingly, if 
the foreign intervention took place in support of State that is fighting against the non-state 
armed group, it does not mean that relationships have turned to be internationalized between 
each other. There is no "interference" of IAC, because state that has intervened to support 
another state military activity against non-state armed group, therefore foreign party has 
commenced military activity against such non-State armed group, and not another legally 
recognized state. Thinking in such manner crucial point is releveled, that from the perspective 
of IHL, the foreign intervention is considered as the separate factor to the already existing 
NIAC.
45
The legal rules applicable to NIAC should be directly applicable to the 
internationalized type of NIAC, because, firstly, the belligerent relationship between state 
parties that intervened on behalf another State party in fighting against non-state party exists, 
secondly, state party that intervened, has commenced a military activity against the Non-State 
party respectively. In the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre Trial Chamber of 
International Criminal Court (hereinafter “ICC”) stated that  
an internal armed conflict that breaks out on the territory of a State might become 
international – or, depending on the circumstances, be international alongside an 
internal armed conflict – if i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its 
troops (direct intervention) or if ii) some of the participants in the internal armed 
conflict act on behalf of that other State (indirect intervention)".
46
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In the case of Yemen, the intervention can be defined as direct, because the Saudi-led 
coalition has intervened directly using its aircraft and ground forces in support of the official 
Yemen government. Concerning fragmented approach, it can be concluded that Yemen case 
is unique, because it includes both NIAC type and Internationalized NIAC, because the 
military confrontation is going between Yemen government and Houthis on the one hand, and 
on the other hand, it is going between coalition against Houthi, where the coalition acts on 
behalf of the official government(as co-belligerent) by directly supporting it in military 
means. 
1.2.2. Applicable law and legal test 
Since the argument mentioned in above-mentioned sub-chapter related to "fragmented 
approach", that law applicable to NIAC applies to the Internationalized NIAC, if the firstly, 
the state is involved in a military confrontation with the non-state group with the intervention 
of the third states or the group of the countries has value to support the government against 
the non-state armed group, and consequently does not has the effect of internationalizing 
relationships between armed groups, and 
Under the fragmented approach described above, the ICRC considers that when a 
foreign power intervenes in support of the State party, the law of NIAC applies.
47 
To determine the affiliation of the Yemen conflict to NIAC, the particular legal test should be 
conducted, which points out the material elements to affirm the existence of the armed 
conflict. The “test” for armed conflict derives from Tadic, Limaj and Boškovski judgements, 
where the Trial Chamber has identified two criteria for the case of internal armed conflict, 
namely the (1) organisational element of the parties to the conflict, whether such conflict 
diverges from activities 
48
 done by parties to the conflict, and (2) when an armed conflict meet 
the required intensity threshold.
49
 The test has been established with purposive nature, in 
order to distinguish armed conflict from less violent events, such as terrorist activities, riots or 
demonstrations.
50
 Organisational element is used to explain the basis on the context of Article 
1(1) of APII and Tadic Appeal Judgement, Limaj, Halilovic Trial Judgements. Conversely, 
the intensity threshold is used to explain the basis on Article 1(2) of APII and Tadic Appeal 
Judgement, respectively.   
Organizational element 
Firstly it is crucial to define the conditions, which elaborate term of "armed conflict" in the 
context of APII, and which is critical to determining NIAC existence. In this regard, those 
firstly came from understanding the criteria of "armed group", which is first, the opposing 
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party to the government, secondly, the armed group that take part in hostilities.
51
 Moreover, it 
has been evidenced that the specific degree of organisation is required for the elaboration of 
the armed group for the purpose of CA3. However, it has not been determined in 
jurisprudence, so the main focus for the test goes under the context of APII.
52
 The common 
practice is set to differentiate acts of violence that are resulted from hostilities between two 
parties that have certain obligations and status to act as a military structure, which is different 
from acts of banditry, rebellion or the protests by the group of people, which does not have 
the substantive character to be qualified as an armed group.
53
 Here, Article 1(1) of APII 
related to the material scope of application clearly defines armed groups as  
Dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations.
54
 
Therefore, in Boškovski case the Trial Chamber gives reference to Tadic Appeal 
Judgement, where the Appeals Chamber has observed that  
 “an organised group […] normally has a structure, a chain of command and a set of 
rules as well as the outward symbols of authority” and that its members do not act on 
their own but conform “to the standards prevailing in the group” and are “subject to 
the authority of the head of the group”.55 
Furthermore, in Limaj Trial Judgement Trial Chamber noted that non-state party to the 
conflict should reflect some degree of an organisation, and that will establish the existence of 
armed conflict.
56
 In Halilović case Trial Chamber relied on the idea that organizational 
character of armed group in the face of Croatian Defence Council, the Bosnian-Serb army and 
the Bosnian army is the satisfied basis on the engagement of military entities in military 
tactics that are able to perform and achieve military objectives.
57
 Such interpretation is 
directly applicable for the SPC and Houthis, who have conducted a significant amount of 
successful military operations on the Yemen territory against governmental and coalition 
forces.
58
 Houthi are, as per historical background, independent military movement with its 
current leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi, which firstly, has waged military uprising and has 
seized the significant amount of the territory that belonged to the official government. 
Regarding organisational structure, the joint army of Houthi and Saleh forces has a clear 
military hierarchy of commanding officers, which are in the rule of its armed forces; hence, 
the centralised military command of the armed forces exists between a ground, missile and 
naval forces.
59
 Additionally, the SPC has a clear political division to ministries, which are 
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responsible for ruling de-facto unrecognized government, therefore SPC and Houthi have 
their own flag, slogan and ideology which is famous for its abhorrence towards US and 
Israel.
60
 From this perspective, it can be said that SPC is the political "entity", which has its 
armed group in the face of Houthi movement and Pro-Saleh forces, under, the criteria of 
"armed group" for recognition of armed conflict fit to Yemen case.  
Level of Intensity 
Intensity threshold is a bit more complicated to be assessed from a legal perspective, because 
there is no clear explanation what intensity of hostilities should be confirmed in the context of 
APII and CA3, to demonstrate the existence of an armed conflict in Yemen in the context of 
NIAC and to what extent the violations of IHL are provable. Article 1(2) of APII states that 
This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such 
as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not 
being armed conflicts.
61
 
Since APII clearly underlines the material scope of the application, on the other hand, it does 
not clarifies what the criteria of the level of intensity to distinguish situations that have no 
ground to be legally counted as an armed conflictfrom the legally identified armed conflict 
are.  
Firstly, in order to differentiate NIAC from the sporadic acts of violence
62
, the criteria 
of protracted violence had been assessed in the Tadic judgement by the Trial Chamber
63
. It is 
a preferably additional temporal element for defining the intensity level in conflict as NIAC, 
which is used for examining situations of violent nature, taking into consideration exclusion 
of the temporal limits of the indictment, in order to identify the actual “protracted” nature of 
the violence in the conflict.
64
 For instance, In Celebiči Trial Judgement, Trial Chamber has 
found that armed violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina has continued from March 1992 until 
November 1995, with indictment period from May to December 1992, where the protracted 
violence has been evidenced.
65
 With regard to the Yemen conflict, since the paper covers the 
substantive analysis of events starting from September 2015, so, it means that the element of 
protracted violence should be assessed mainly from September 2015. The duration of violence 
has been ongoing for five years, so, it can be said that the requirement of the term has been 
met at least from a factual point of view. Furthermore, with reference to Tadic Trial 
Judgement, ICTY had defined in Haradinaj case the primary indicative factors to be met in 
analysing intensity threshold, which is connected to protracted nature of violence.
66
 The most 
relevant for Yemen case scenario are: 
 (1) The gravity of violence on the territory of the state should be significant, including 
the serious nature of attacks and increase in clashes;
67
 Therefore, the extent of destruction and 
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the number of casualties, including civilians that have suffered from the hostilities, and have 
forced to flee zones, where the hostilities take place.
68
 With regard to Yemen, from March 24, 
2015, till January 4, 2020, have been evidenced 43,392 violent events, including violations of 
law, armed clashes, violence against civilians, demonstrations etc., and 102,043 reported 
fatalities, including the deaths among the civilian population.
69
 Consequently, the basis on 
such big numbers, it can be said that the gravity of violence and magnitude of attacks in 
Yemen has remained significant from the moment when the coalition commenced its 
intervention till current days, because the conflict is still ongoing.   
(2) The conflict attracts the attention of United Nations Security Council (hereinafter 
“UNSC”) with subsequent resolutions to be passed.70 Since the retake of power by Houthi 
occured in 2015, UNSC has passed  9 resolutions on different matters,
71
 including extension 
of assets freezing, arms embargo, but the important ones are Resolution 2201 from 15 
February 2015, which condemns Houthi unilateral actions to dissolve official government of 
Yemen,
72
 and Resolution 2451 with an aim to respecting Stockholm agreement on the 
ceasefire in Yemen.
73
  
To conclude considerations on the above mentioned criteria, it is hard to say, can the 
armed conflict under NIAC be identified if only one criterion meets for its determination? If 
the armed conflict has occurred and is defined as "armed" taking into consideration 
circumstances, which reflect its nature, usually, it should meet more than one criterion that 
elaborates its occurrence, because criteria are connected to each other. In Yemen conflict, 
government is in confrontation with the non-state actor, such as, SPC and Houthi, which is an 
group that has organizational character (criterion 1) basis on the above considerations, hence, 
the existing “confrontation” raises criterion of the intensity hostilities that happens in 
protracted way. (criterion 2). 
1.2.3. Status of indiscriminate attacks under IHL 
Concerning the definition of indiscriminate attacks, which are taken as the core in further 
legal analysis, it is essential to note that APII does not clearly determine rules that set 
emphasis on definition of indiscriminate attacks, as well as state practices in non-international 
armed conflict.
74
 Conversely, the idea of CIHL Rule 12 that relates to the definition of 
indiscriminate attacks only appears in reasoning within the prohibition of attacking civilian 
population written in Article 13(2) of APII,
75
and article 3(8)(a) of the Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices(Protocol 
II) related to the placement of indiscriminate weapons being subject that is not directed 
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against military objective,
76
  and which is applicable to the NIAC,
77
 reflects the definition of 
indiscriminate attacks set in the customary rule, which implies an attack by bombardment or 
the attack which may cause incidental loss of civilian life.
78
 It is important to note that the 
current analysis set emphasis on the indiscriminate attacks, meaning the airstrikes, but not the 
conventional tools of combat that Protocol II to Convention on Certain Convention weapons 
covers,
79
 e.g. mines, baby-traps and other devices, hence, it falls out of the scope of the 
application of the protocol, but provides with the relevant reflection of the definition. 
Consequently, the only legal source that is relevant to be taken into consideration about 
indiscriminate attacks, meaning airstrikes, are customary rules, which are accompanied by the 
legal practice. Rule 12 defines indiscriminate attacks as those, 
(a) which are not directed at a specific military objective;
80
 
(b) which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a 
specific military objective; or
81
 
(c) which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be 
limited as required by international humanitarian law;
82
 
Moreover, consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military 
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
83
 
Indiscriminate attacks in its nature are prohibited. Moreover, those may result from 
indiscriminate means by using banned weapons or the particular method of combat.
84
 
There are two types of indiscriminate forms of combat, first is, when an attack is carried 
out without any effort to identify objects as military objects, these are also called “blind 
attacks” or “intentional attacks” against civilians and civilian objects  and are a more rare 
case, which is investigated, when military operations are carried out.
85
 Second are the type 
of attacks, that are directed against military personnel or objective, which is located or 
built-in scattered or “single” way with civilian objects or where civilians are located. In 
such case, the prohibition of attack applies if an attacking party can determine each 
military target separately and conduct an attack on separate object or combatants 
respectively, however, it is prohibited because the nature of an object is still joint with the 
means of a civilian objective, or civilians are present.
86
 However, if objects are not clearly 
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separated, the attack on such can be considered as the legitimate, attack does not fall under 
the term of being indiscriminate, because the presence of combatants empowers belligerent 
to conduct attack in circumstance, if the presence of military objects is detected. Moreover, 
if an attacking party is not able to determine military target separately, it is questioned 
whether the planned conduct is proportionate.
87
  
In the Prosecutor V. Kupresic the framework of the lawfulness of indiscriminate 
attacks falls under the existence of the cumulative effect, whether the single or repeated 
attacks target military objects, but it incidentally caused damage to the civilians and civilian 
objects too.
88
 If attacks are repeated, it can be simply concluded that conduct is unlawful, 
because it is clear and evident that attacks are not targeted to the military objective.
89
 In case 
of single attacks, it can be considered that generally, it is questionable, whether it(single 
attack) can be considered as lawful conduct because party have not respected precautions to 
avoid incidental damage to civilians.
90
 The problem of precautions is in lack of requirement to 
perform precaution, if those are not feasible or practically possible, because there is no clear 
legal rule that elaborates on that. Article 3(10) of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons, states that, 
All feasible precautions shall protect civilians from the effects of weapons to which 
this Article applies. Feasib1e precautions are those precautions which are practicable 
or practically possible taking into account circumstances ruling at the time, including 
humanitarian and military considerations.
91
 
It can be concluded, that even if the single indiscriminate attack has triggered visible damage 
to civilians, the protection of civilians was not respected. Hence, the conduct can be 
considered unlawful. However, such interpretation should be reaffirmed by the factual basis 
of the situation.  
1.2.4. Status of cluster munitions under IHL 
According to Article 2(2) of Convention on Cluster Munitions,  
“Cluster Munition” means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or 
release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms and includes 
those explosive submunitions.
92
 
In the context of Yemen conflict, none of the countries to the Saudi-coalition have accessed, 
signed or ratified the convention,
93
 hence, the coalition states are not bound to apply rules of 
the Convention in the cases, where any breach of convention rules occurred. Despite this fact, 
Customary IHL rules, which coalition states are bound to,
94
 specifically, rule 71 related to the 
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prohibition of use weapons that are in nature indiscriminate applies to cluster munitions basis 
on the provided examples from ICRC.
95
 From one point, it can be said that rule on the 
prohibition of indiscriminate attacks is linked with the rule on the prohibition of 
indiscriminate weapons, or even one supplements another, because nature of indiscriminate 
attacks may be based on the use of indiscriminate weapons.
96
 However, it has been articulated 
in separate custom. Furthermore, the applicability of Rule 71 to NIAC from one perspective is 
a questionable, because Additional Protocol I
97
 and ICC Statute
98
 limit the application of the 
rule to the IACs’. However, it has been said that if the use of indiscriminate attacks has been 
accepted in NIAC, the use of indiscriminate weapons can be equalized as the matter of 
prohibition of law in a very similar manner. 
Rule 71, in fact, like Rule 70, could be used on its own as a basis for extending 
weaponry prohibitions to all armed conflicts, since the nature of a weapon will be the 
same, whatever the circumstances and situation of its use.
99 
Concerning the use of indiscriminate weapons, such as cluster munitions, it is vital to 
elaborate not on the fact of the use of the munitions, because these ipso facto can be 
considered unlawful per customary law.
100
  Attention should be taken on the conditions and 
effects of the use of illegal weapons in an unlawful manner, particularly by observing 
circumstances of targeting the civilian population and civilian objects in case of 
indiscriminate attack. ICJ revealed in the advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons by making explicit remarks on the effect of the use of prohibited weapons 
with relation to the essential sense of the IHL principles, clarifying that state must ensure the 
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, as well as respect the principle of 
distinction between civilians and combatants, moreover, the state must not target civilians by 
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making them as an object of attack, therefore, use weapons, that are incapable of 
distinguishing between civilian and military targets.
101
 For such consideration, states are 
limited in nature of their choice to use certain weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering 
to the civilian population; therefore, cluster munitions apply in this case because the 
magnitude of damage, which weapon poses is significant.
102
  
1.2.5. Summary 
Above-mentioned considerations set a clear understanding of how the Yemen conflict should 
be determined, what legal issues have been raised concerning the analysis of the type of the 
conflict, what applicable law should be used. Regarding applicable law determination, it can 
be concluded that there is no practical difference of application of specific legal rules if the 
conflict is considered as the Internationalized NIAC and not a “default” NIAC. Fragmented 
approach established by ICRC explains the way, how Internationalized NIAC is linked to the 
fundamental NIAC basis on the existing belligerent relationships. In Yemen, intervention by 
the coalition has turned the conflict in the phase of Internationalized NIAC, and, the criteria of 
"organizational character" and appropriate "level of intensity" is respected. Therefore, it can 
be summarized that legal rules applicable to NIAC, hence, CA3, APII and relevant rules of 
CIHL apply to the Yemen conflict, respectively. 
2.  ASSESSMENT OF VIOLATIONS OF IHL IN YEMEN BY SAUDI-LED 
COALITION 
The current chapter assesses violations of IHL in Yemen by Saudi-led coalition, by explaining 
unlawfulness of conducted actions depending on different situations, where indiscriminate 
attacks and use of cluster munitions have been evidenced. For its part, the unlawfulness of the 
conducts can be determined from different projections depending on circumstances of the 
situation, limits of the law and existing legal practices of norms and standards related to the 
application of the specific rules. The approach is followed by explaining chain of analysis: 
firstly, explanation of the situation is carried out, where the alleged violations are evidenced, 
secondly, determination of the legal issues, that set the scope of the applicable law, thirdly, 
applicable law that is suitable in explaining unlawfulness of actions, fourthly, legal analysis of 
“unlawfulness” together with the found applicable law to particular situation, where the 
violation is alleged. Chapter allocates cases of indiscriminate attacks, such as attacks on steam 
power plant housing complex, attack on al-fyoush cattle market, where civilian population 
and civilian objects were attacked as well as the attack on cement factory with the use of 
cluster munitions.  
2.1. Attack on Steam power plant housing complex near Mokha city 
Facts of the case 
On July 24, 2015, the Saudi coalition launched airstrikes on residential compound houses, 
where workers of the steam power plant and their family members lived, that located near the 
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city of Mokha, therefore, airstrikes resulted in the killing of 63 civilians and injuries of 50 
other people.
103
 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch being as the credible sources 
from the ground has visited power plant three days after the airstrike has been conducted and 
have taken 21 interviews with residents of the city and workers of the plant, who has not 
suffered from the airstrike.
104
 Resident Amal Sabri commented about the situation as 
following:   
“something out of judgement day. Corpses and heads scattered, engulfed by fire and 
ashes”105 
According to the interviews, it was evidenced, that nine bombs were dropped targeting main 
housing complex and maintenance equipment storage, a second housing complex and nearby 
territory.
106
 Amnesty International observers have not found the evidence, that residential 
complex and power plant were used for military purposes, therefore, it was not evidenced that 
military personnel was present in the buildings; therefore, it was also evidenced that one 
airstrike hit second housing compound, which is located 1 kilometre north from the main 
complex resulted in civilian casualties.
107
(see Annex 1). The vital point in this situation is that 
Military facility was detected about 800 meters South-East to the main housing complex, 
where the airstrikes were conducted. It was not evidenced that airstrikes hit a military 
facility.
108
 Therefore, plant workers said that the military base was abandoned, furthermore, 
Human Rights Watch observers have not found any presence of activity on the base, 
confirming that it was without the presence of military forces.
109
  
Since the facts of the situation are considerably clear, it is essential to observe 
questions with relation to given facts of the case, to analyze applicable law and implications 
to the specific situation. Are workers considered as the civilian population and, is housing 
complex considered as a civilian object under IHL? Are airstrikes on housing complex 
considered as an indiscriminate attack? How can the unlawfulness of attack be explained in a 
given situation? Can the conduct in the face of airstrikes in such a specific situation be 
justified?  
2.1.1. Applicable law and assessment of unlawfulness of the conduct  
Current sub-chapter looks into the legal sources applicable to the particular situation, in order 
to analyse the respective chain of analysis related to the unlawfulness of individual conduct. 
Firstly, contrary practice to APII article 1(1) is used to define the status of workers as the 
civilian population. Therefore, article 13(2) of APII related to the prohibition of the attack on 
the civilian population is used to assess the nature of the conduct that violated the prohibition. 
Secondly, the rules of CIHL applicable to NIAC are used in addition to the provisions set up 
in the APII, or in case of absence of such conditions. Such rules are: rule 8 related to the 
definition of military objects; rule 9 related to the definition of civilian objects; rules 11, 12 
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related to the legality and definition of indiscriminate attacks; rule 21 related to target 
selection; and rule 89 related to prohibition of murder. Thirdly, relevant case law is used for 
providing examples in already existent legal practice. 
Turning to the analysis, firstly, due to the fact, that conducted airstrikes had targeted 
housing complex and, it has resulted in deaths of the people, definitions of civilians and 
civilian objects should be determined. APII does not set a clear definition of the civilians, 
however, it can be concluded that per established practice, the civilian population is a 
“contrary” to the definition of organized armed groups set in the Article 1(1) of APII, by 
noticing that civilians are not related to the organized armed group or being a part of dissident 
armed forces.
110
 In the particular case, it cannot be evidenced that the civilian population was 
the part of dissident armed forces or armed groups because persons performed purely civilian 
actions by working on the power plant. Furthermore, in Haradinaj case Appeal Chamber 
refers to the definition of civilians as “persons, not taking an active part in hostilities”, which 
is the general reflection of CA3.
111
 In the present case, there are no factual grounds to 
consider individuals to take part in any kind of hostilities, because the attack took place 
remotely, and at the home front, where no direct confrontation was evidenced by the 
reporters. 
Concerning “civilian objects definition”, APII does not clearly define the legal status 
of it, however, according to rule 9 of CIHL applicable to NIAC, these are all objects that are 
not military objects,
112
 on the other hand, military objects per Rule 8 of CIHL applicable to 
NIAC, are objects, that are used to make a useful contribution towards military action, and 
those, partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization offers a military advantage.
113
 In 
present case housing complex cannot be considered as a military object, because it does not 
offer a military advantage in case of its destruction by an airstrike, due to its usage for living 
purposes, therefore, there is no clear evidence, that it has been used for the military purposes.  
With regard to the issue of finding indications of an indiscriminately conducted attack, 
it can be said if the housing complex was intentionally designated being as the aim of attack 
without intentionally targeting a military object, naming military facility near the complex, it 
will fall under terms of “indiscriminate” right away. Since there was no clear evidence, that 
military facility was used for the military purposes and contained military personnel, when the 
airstrikes were conducted, and no damage has been given to the military facility, it can be 
concluded that airstrikes have not been directed towards the military object, but were directed 
towards the civilian object in an intentional manner, so basis on the factual background and 
evidence, it cannot be said that manner was non-intentional to strike civilians. In Galic case, 
ICTY has elaborated on the “intentional” nature of the indiscriminate attacks, stating that such 
clarification relates to “attacks which strike civilians or civilian objects and military objects 
without distinction, may qualify as direct attacks against civilians”. In the current case, it was 
the definitely intentional basis on the assumption that “behaviour” of the coalition was 
primarily to target civilians since there were no comments from coalition side. The unlawful 
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nature conduct is similar to conduct, which Trial Chamber had pointed out in Blaškic case, 
where perpetrators had wanted to intentionally target Muslim population in the town of Stari 
Vitez, because it resulted in death among civilians.
114
 Going point by points of the context of 
rule 12 of CIHL and its application, it can be concluded that attack on housing complex was 
indiscriminate, because (1) attack was not directed at a military object, (2) the effect of attack 
cannot be limited as required by IHL rules, because from the beginning it was 
intentional.With regard to affirming unlawfulness of the conduct, it can be said that coalition 
has violated rule 11 of CIHL applicable in NIAC, because the use of indiscriminate attacks 
are prohibited in nature.
115
 In addition to case-law and CIHL rules Article 13(2) of APII 
applies, which states that  
The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object 
of attack. Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror 
among the civilian population are prohibited.
116
  
Such understanding is followed by the general prohibition of murder in the context of IHL. 
According to rule 89 of CIHL applicable to NIAC, the murder of any kinds is prohibited.
117
 
Wording of the custom is based on the fundamental guarantee set in the article 4(2)(a) of 
APII, which states that any violence of life is prohibited, including murder.
118
It can be 
concluded that coalition by holding indiscriminate airstrikes had violated above-mentioned 
legal rules and failed to comply with fundamental guarantees related to the prohibition of 
murder, since the above-mentioned rules apply in the current situation.  
The analysis can go much beyond because a lot of CIHL rules can be covered for only 
one specific situation, and in this particular situation, the issue covers the issue of 
discrimination by performing the unlawful conduct. However, the target selection test must be 
done in this specific scenario to make conclusions on the unlawfulness of the killings. 
Concerning the application of target selection rule 21 of CIHL, which elaborates on the idea 
that each party must choose the target for attack, which would cause a lest danger to the 
civilian population,
119
 has led to consider attack as unlawful, because housing complex per 
given facts has been incorrectly considered as the military object, hence, it does not empowers 
coalition aircraft to conduct airstrike if the target is not determined as military target basis on 
exploration data provided by responsible people in armed forces, for instance, intelligence.  
Concerning possible justification of the airstrikes, de-facto there are no arguments, 
that would justify the particular conduct in steam power plant case, because indiscriminate 
attacks are prohibited, and the coalition has intentionally bombed the housing complex. It can 
be considered that possible justification for an airstrike could be due to coincidence, for 
instance, the failure of the weapon system to strike a military base instead of a housing 
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complex. However, it cannot be proved that the attack was random, and an airstrike was 
conducted being the non-intentional basis on the given facts from the ground. Therefore, such 
consideration can be declined, meaning that even if the conduct is not directed against 
protected persons, e.g. civilian population. Still, it has been practically commenced, even it 
has been prevented due to unexpected circumstances, it practically endangers life and health 
of civilians, and anyway constitute in a violation basis on existing applicable treaty rules and 
customs. 
2.2. Attack on Al-Fyoush cattle market in Lahj governorate 
Facts of the case 
On July 6, 2015, coalition airstrikes hit the cattle market in the village of Al-Fyoush, which 
resulted in killing 48 civilians and injury of 85.
120
 According to Bellingcat findings, strikes 
had targeted territory near Qat (Cattle) market, restaurant and petrol station.
121
 It was 
concluded that two craters were formed after two munitions were dropped. The basis on the 
Bellingcat research, it can be said that incident took place near the road N1 and connecting 
road B19, near the crossroad of which the market is located (See Annex 2). About the 
utilization of the market basis on the research, it was used primarily for the commercial 
purposes for selling and buying cattle, therefore, it should be noted that other civilian objects 
are located near the territory of the market, specifically, mosque, supermarkets, restaurants, 
etc.(See Annex 2). Therefore, a respective territory can be considered as the passing locations 
for people, who are moving in the opposite direction of N1 road.(See Annex 2) Adam Hassan 
Umar has told the Amnesty International, that plane flew around the area for some time, then, 
the explosion occurred.
122
 
Regarding the presence of military forces on the market during the attack, sources 
differentiate in their considerations. National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations 
to Human Rights rely on the point of the witnesses, who were likely visiting the market on a 
daily basis. Witness "N.F.M.” has said that near market there were two checkpoints of the 
Houthi and Saleh Forces; conversely, Witness A.S.S. said that on the date, when airstrikes 
were conducted Houthis have established checkpoint that was located 200 metres from the 
market.
123
 An important fact is, that, possibly, interviews of witnesses were taken with the 
presence of military personnel, however, it is not elaborated, to which party military 
personnel belonged to. Report from LA Times relied on the statement of the witness, who 
said that car with the Houthi soldiers inside has arrived in the market before the airstrike to 
make purchases on the market.
124
 Also, LA times consider that 6 Houthi Fighters were killed 
during the attack.
125
 Official Spokesman of Joint Accidents Assessment Teams (JIAT), who is 
close to Saudi authorities and Saudi Press Agency has elaborated on the airstrike from the 
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coalition perspective, mentioning that done investigation has decreed that no airstrike has 
been conducted on the respective territory, especially cattle market, although, two airstrikes 
were conducted on the Houthi militias concentration on the market and on command point ten 
kilometres north from the market.
126
 Questions, which arise in the current situation, are the 
following: Can the attack be considered as indiscriminate and how applicable law explains it? 
Was the attack intentional or not, and how legally it can be explained? What legal grounds 
demonstrate unlawfulness of the airstrike?  
2.2.1. Applicable law and assessment of unlawfulness of the conduct 
Current sub-chapter looks into the applicability of the legal sources such as article 13(1) of 
APII, the relevant rules of CIHL applicable to NIAC, such as, rule 1, 7 related to the principle 
of distinction, rule 10 related to loss of protection of civilian objective, rule 11, 12 related to 
legal nature of indiscriminate attacks, rule 14 related to the principle of proportionality, rule 
15 related to the principle of precautions in attacks, and respective case law practice such as 
Galic and Boškovski Appeal Judgements.  
In order to explain unlawfulness of the conduct in the particular situation, it is 
important to make references to the definitions, which apply in the current situation, and that 
already have been discussed in steam power plant case above and apply in current case 
respectively. Practice, contrary to Article 1(1) of APII, rules 5, 8 and 9 of CIHL, determine 
definitions of civilians, military objects, and civilian objects. With regard to the civilian 
population, the rule 5 of CIHL apply,  because firstly, the individuals were the affected party 
without indications to recognize them as combatants, because they performed purely 
commercial activities related to doing business in the market. Secondly, definitions of military 
objects and civilian objects apply, due to the necessity to distinguish objects in the situation 
and assess the existence of indiscriminate attack.  The analysis of determination and 
application of CIHL rules related to civilian and military objects is set further.  
The approach, which is taken to evaluate the attack in terms of being indiscriminate, is 
following. In the current situation, it can be said that attack was directed on objects, where 
military personnel was present as per existing investigations. In the present case, cattle market 
cannot fall under the definition of a military objective, because the scope of rule 8 of CIHL is 
about military advantage and not “the presence of military forces”.127 In this case, it cannot be 
said that cattle market with presence of Houthi fighters on the ground that have “created” 
circumstance for coalition aircraft to decide that bombing of one group of fighters or the 
checkpoint will create real military advantage against the opposing side. Hence, cattle market 
falls under the civilian object definition, and rule 9 of CIHL applies. Moreover, rule 10 can be 
applied, which states that civilian object is protected, unless such is the military objective. 
Since the rule is applicable to NIAC, unfortunately, it does not clarify the criteria that explain 
why civilian object may become military objectives.  It can be said that cattle market is 
subject to criteria that make it to be clarified as the military objective, for instance, market use 
for military purposes or for performing military action.
128
However, those are merely legal 
speculations, because those are not pointed out in the particular applicable law. To conclude 
the idea of rule 10, it can be said that cattle market is not likely to lose its civilian protection, 
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because there are no legal provisions that can clarify “change in status”, therefore, from 
practical perspective, even presumptions will not clarify market as military objective, because 
it was not used for military purposes, at least basis on the factual grounds. Accordingly to 
such argument, cattle market “falls” under the definition of civilian objective. Next question is 
about checkpoints near market, especially their status under the definition of military object. 
By applying rule 8 of CIHL, it can be considered that attack on checkpoints employ military 
advantage, because its destruction may decrease presence of armed forces in the particular 
area, and mitigate the control over the crucial road, which is also considered as the advantage 
from logistical point of view. It can be assumed that presence of checkpoints among civilian 
objective (market) make the possibility of attack counting it as performing legitimate 
purposes and not indiscriminate, because the airstrike primarily had aimed to target 
checkpoints and enemy combatants, however with incidental loss of civilians explained by the 
matter of principle of distinction, taking precautions and proportionality in deciding to attack 
that were not respected, and which are discussed further. 
It can be said that holding airstrike against checkpoints and enemy combatants, which 
were present among civilian population is considered as disrespect of the principle of 
distinction pointed out in rule 1 and rule 7 of CIHL that applies in current situation.
129
 UN 
General Assembly in Resolution 2444 has proposed remarks on the conduct in armed conflict 
with regard to principle of distinction, meaning that firstly, right of the parties to establish 
means of injuring is not unlimited, secondly, the attacks on the civilians are prohibited at any 
time, thirdly, the distinction between civilians and combatants always must be taken in the 
account.
130
 In Galic Appeal judgement, Appeal Chamber had pointed out that  
warring parties must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants, between civilian and military objectives, and accordingly direct attacks 
only against military objectives.
131 
However, if principle of distinction is not respected, it does not mean that attack can be 
considered as unlawful or indiscriminate. In Boškoski Appeal Judgment, Appeal Chamber had 
pointed out that  
the targeting of civilians is absolutely prohibited in customary international law, and 
that civilian casualties are only legitimate if their deaths are incidental to the conduct 
of military operations.
132 
It can be considered that coalition airstrike has caused incidental deaths among civilian 
population, because according to facts and JIAT remarks, the initial objective was to target 
Houthi military forces and military objects. The main issue here falls under the 
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proportionality of an attack and taking the necessary precautions in order to avoid incidental 
loss among the civilian population.  
Following the principle of distinction, the coalition has ignored requirements under the 
principle of precautions in their attacks under the rule 15 of CIHL applicable to NIAC, 
especially, failure to spare the civilian population and civilian objects, as well as no actions 
has been taken to minimize incidental loss of civilian lives and damage to civilian 
objects.
133
In addition, Article 13(1) of APII elaborates general protection to civilian 
population and individual civilians from the danger that arises in case of a military operation, 
consequently, the coalition has not taken any actions to preserve the protection of civilians, 
besides, and the committed conduct has resulted in disrespect of such general protection. It 
can be assumed that to lawfully target potentially recognized military target, which is located 
near multiple civilian targets, the appropriate means of warfare basically should exclude the 
use of aircraft in such situation because such method can be considered as ineffective for 
accurate targeting objects. Commanders must assess the reality of military advantage and 
proportionality of action for targeting two checkpoints or the car with Houthi fighters if such 
advantage can lead to deaths among civilians. Since there is evidence, that Houthi forces were 
present in the market during the attack, the coalition has not taken any precautions to 
minimize the effect of the airstrikes and avoid loss, even incidental towards the civilian 
population, according to rule 15 of CIHL, which applies in current situation.  
With regard to principle of proportionality in attack that is defined by the rule 14 of 
CIHL apply, which elaborates on the point that launching an attack that may result in 
incidental loss of civilian lives and cause damage to civilian objects, and, attack is excessive 
in its nature to perform specific military advantage is prohibited.
134
 Due to the fact that 
airstrike has resulted in damage to market and deaths among civilian population, attacks in 
nature cannot be considered as proportionate, because coalition has not factored the necessity 
and proportionate conditions to launch attack in a way that death of civilians will be avoided 
and amount of harm that was “posed” on the civilians. Attack did not look proportionate to 
the military advantage, than advantage intended to be, possibly, from the coalition 
perspective. 
It can be concluded that application of rule 12 of CIHL related to definition of 
indiscriminate attacks is in a way uncertain and can be rejected, because, it is questionable, 
was an attack directed on purpose to target civilian objectives(market), even if the airstrike in 
result has damaged the property of the market and not checkpoint. Analysis correlates with 
the assessment of non-intentional nature of the attack. In current situation the non-intentional 
behaviour to target civilian population is likely to take place, due to presence of legitimate 
targets on the market in face of enemy combatants, which were primarily target of the 
coalition. However the primary intention to target combatants or military targets, which is 
located among civilian targets and civilian population, does not deprive coalition forces from 
the responsibility to respect principle of distinction, take necessary precautions and employ 
mean of combat that will be proportionate in such case. Such disrespect make the attack on 
cattle market being unlawful.  
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2.3. Attack on Cement factory quarry in Amran governorate using 
cluster munitions 
On February 15, 2016, coalition aircraft have conducted several airstrikes on the al-Raha 
mountain, next to Amran cement factory quarry, located 1 kilometre from the main building 
cement factory in Amran Governorate. No deaths or injuries among the workers or civilian 
population were evidenced, except the material damage to the factory quarry, according to 
HRW report.
135
 The case is a vital example, where the so-called cluster munitions, such as 
US-supplied CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons with BLU-108 canisters, were used.
136
 Factory 
workers, along with HRW observers, have investigated the damage and have found the 
remnants of the munitions that were laying down on the road that connects factory with the 
quarry.
137
  The reporter provided Human Rights Watch with a 37-second video that he 
said they filmed during the attack. The video shows multiple distinctive black smoke clouds 
generated by the CBU-105 submunitions emanating from a strike behind a ridgeline while 
multiple detonations can be heard in the video.
138
Furthermore, it is vital to point out that use 
of cluster munitions was primarily targeted the Al-Raha Mountain, where the military base of 
Houthis was located, which is in close proximity of al-Darb village, where the civilian 
population was present.
139
 According to HRW report, a military base with present Houthis 
forces was located two kilometres from the quarry, which has been damaged during an 
airstrike.
140
   
2.3.1. Applicable law and assessment of unlawfulness of the conduct 
The analysis aims to explain the nature of the indiscriminate attack and the use of 
indiscriminate weapons with respective applicable law. Firstly, appropriate definitions are 
used for classification of civilian and military objects(Rules 8,9 of CIHL), rule 12 related to 
indiscriminate attacks are used to detect or reject its presence. Secondly, the law chosen to 
explain the use of indiscriminate weapons is rule 71 of CIHL that applies to NIAC. It is 
relevant to point out that none of the coalition states is parties to Convention on cluster 
munitions, thereby it is not applicable in this situation.  
The main legal questions are, does the attack in particular situation clarify as 
indiscriminate one, and how applicable law explains it? Why had the use of cluster munitions 
been unlawful in a specific case? 
Since there are no documented civilian casualties after an attack, and only material 
damage has been posed, it is the subject of the application of rules related to the definition of 
civilian and military objects, because one of those “type” of objects has been directly or 
incidentally hit. Practically, there is no difference towards which “type” of the object the 
attack was performed, because anyway, the use of indiscriminate weapons is prohibited under 
the Rules 70 and 71 of CIHL. However, the task is also to define the nature of the 
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indiscriminate attack, thereby rules 8 and 9 of CIHL are used as the source of the definition of 
the status of the civilian and military objects.
141
 The identification of the status should be 
made towards factory quarry, which was hit. In this case, rule 8 of CIHL cannot be applied 
because quarry cannot be considered as the military object. After all, it does not perform any 
military advantage by targeting it. It can be assumed that targeting factory quarry pursuit 
exclusively economic benefit by the destruction of the object, that contributes to performing 
economic-related objectives, such as mining operations. Of course, from one point minerals 
that are extracted can be used for military purposes, in this case, cement made from minerals 
can be used for the construction of military objectives, e.g. military equipment that is used for 
military purposes. However, an argument can be rejected, because the factory and quarry have 
been closed for some time, due to recent airstrikes on the object, so, it has not performed any 
economic activity that would lead to “establishment” of the military advantage as the result of 
such action.
142
  Thereby, quarry falls under the definition of the civilian object. Hence, rule 9 
of CIHL apply.  
It is important to consider, whether the criteria to count an attack as indiscriminate was 
evidenced or not, basis on the application of rule 12 of CIHL. According to rule 12, the attack 
cannot be considered as indiscriminate, because it was initially performed towards the 
military object, naming the military base, which was close to the factory quarry. Hence, the 
airstrike performed purely legitimate objective. However, it caused incidental damage to the 
civilian object.
143
 Again, the approach falls under the respect of the principle of distinction, 
taking necessary precautions and principle of proportionality. In this particular situation, the 
coalition has not respected the rule 7, which applies in the current situation, because coalition 
aircraft were not able to distinguish the civilian objective and military object using the 
particular method of combat – airstrike.144 About precautions, the coalition has not taken any 
care to spare the civilian object from a military object to minimize the incidental damage 
caused to the factory quarry. Hence, rule 15 apply in the current situation. Concerning 
proportionality, it can be concluded that the conduct of coalition was not proportional, 
because the anticipated military advantage was not commensurate to the incidental damage 
caused to the quarry, even it had minimal damage received from an airstrike. 
Turning to the thoughts on the use of indiscriminate weapons, the relevant rule that is 
used to be approached is the rule 71 of CIHL, which states that “use of weapons 
indiscriminate weapons that are by nature indiscriminate is prohibited” directly falls under the 
circumstances of the respective situation.
145
 It is clear whether cluster munitions are related to 
the weapons that can cause indiscriminate effect, because in practice when cluster munitions 
are dropped, those are in a fragmented way targeting the objects in the wide range. Regarding 
the use of cluster munitions in this particular situation and answering the question, why it is 
unlawful, the answer is – because it is prescribed by the law. The coalition used cluster 
munitions as the weapon to perform its military objective, and by direct implementation of the 
rule, it is anyway prohibited. It does not mean that use of a prohibited weapon can be 
legitimate, if it is performing legitimate objectives, in such case, targeting military facilities, 
because the use of those in nature is unlawful.  
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To conclude, the conduct can be considered unlawful, because the airstrike performed 
purely legitimate objective by targeting military base, and has incidentally damaged the 
factory quarry, the explanation of which derives from the underlying necessity to always 
distinguish the military and civilian objects, the principle of precautions and principle of 
proportionality. Secondly, the use of illegal weapons instantly makes the attack illegitimate as 
per prescribed law.  
2.4. Summary 
Above-mentioned subchapters have covered the analysis of applicable law to NIAC, that used 
to demonstrate the illegality of the conduct in the three situations, namely, analysis of rules 
related to the holding indiscriminate attacks and use of cluster munitions, that have been 
found. With regard to the illegality of the particular conducts, it can be concluded that actions 
performed in all three situations are considered as an unlawful, basis on the different 
application of legal rules and presence of specific circumstances in the situations.  
In all three situations, rules related to defining civilians, civilian objects and military 
objects apply that were used to clarify basis related to explanation, were indiscriminate attack 
legally took place or not. It can be concluded that in the first situation presence of intentional 
behaviour of coalition to target the civilians has resulted in the fact of indiscriminate attack 
respectively, with the application of rule 12 of CIHL, that defines indiscriminate attack, rule 
11 of CIHL, that prohibits it, and besides, article 13(2) that prohibits such violent nature of 
conduct towards civilians. In the second and third situation, the basis on the consecutive 
analysis of definitions and circumstances of the attack, it can be concluded that indiscriminate 
attack did not take place basis on the scope of application of rule 12, however the attacks still 
were considered as unlawful, by applying rules related to the principle of distinction, the 
principle of precautions in attacks and principle of proportionality, by the way, which were 
disrespected by the coalition. Finally, the analysis covered the use of cluster munitions in the 
third situation, which is considered unlawful right away, by applying rule 71 of CIHL, that in 
nature prohibits use of such weapons.  
3. VIOLATIONS OF IHL AS AN EXCUSE TOWARDS CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 
Yemen conflict has been demonstrating itself as the conflict where different projections can 
be analysed, including different legal aspects and issues. Applicable law helps to describe the 
unlawfulness of indiscriminate attacks and cluster munitions in particular situations, , 
however legal approach is turned to be deficient in order to explain complete picture of 
considerations that are happening in the Middle Eastern country with regard to presence of 
alleged violations of law. What about the policy considerations and its connection towards 
legal element? 
From one perspective it is not obvious that violations of law can be connected towards the 
political developments in the country, in case such are done from the third party of the 
conflict – the coalition. Here, the treatment, which should be taken, cannot be direct, meaning 
that non-compliance with legal rules will not directly lead to the political dialogue in the 
country, because there are no logical clarifications how the alleged violations of law can be 
connected to the political agenda. Treatment should be taken indirectly, meaning that the 
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circumstances for carrying out certain unlawful actions with concomitant implications of the 
prevailing situation with infringements, that existence of conducting such can be depended 
from the external political factors from the regional and international level, taking into the 
consideration geopolitical frame established in the context of Yemen conflict. In other words 
violations of IHL are the negative consequence of actions of the coalition to establish status-
quo in the region using military methods, which is affected by external factors, outside the 
legal framework. The questions that rise with regard to the political dimension are: How the 
political advantage of intervening party in Yemen can be explained from political 
perspective? Secondly, why Saudi authorities are not compromising with Houthis? Thirdly, 
what external political factors can affect decision-making of coalition authorities? Finally, can 
the existence of unlawful conduct contribute towards establishment of peaceful status-quo? 
Basically, it is questionable, what is the impartial political advantage in such case, because 
again, the role of regional political environment, specifically for Saudi-Arabia is crucial. It is 
not a matter of political motives of Saudi authorities to keep instability near its borders, 
rather, it is matter of political effect of carrying out certain actions (indirect approach) for 
achieving political goals. Humanitarian crisis, which occurred also by carrying out unlawful 
actions, is an implication of illiterate political and military decisions, which in the beginning 
expected to be effective, but turned out to be ineffective, because of unclearness of the 
decision-making process carried out by Saudi side. Of course for Saudi-authorities the victory 
against Houthis will correspond to the victory against the Iran, which is the main opponent for 
Saudi Arabia and UAE in regional confrontation. Current circumstances have shown that if 
Saudi give up in their original initiative, which is possible, to re-establish legitimate 
government of Yemen, it will led to the weakening of the Saudi position in the region, as well 
as, internal political effect for the Saudi establishment can be negatively irreversible, because 
from one point, Saudi establishment is dependent on the U.S interests in the region, especially 
in the means of confronting Iranian interests and economic interests. It is likely that Saudi 
authorities are not biased to have a dialogue of Houthis, because it is equal to have a dialogue 
with Iran, the country, which is destabilizing regional situation in favour of its own interests, 
where the Houthi acts as the safeguard of its interests. From other point, giving up current 
positions for Saudis may have negative impact on the internal situation in the Saudi Arabia, as 
well as jeopardize credibility from official Yemen authorities, that have entrusted their destiny 
to their ally in face of Saudi Arabia and its allies. It can be said that such violent nature of 
Saudi policies in Yemen are directed towards rigid coercion of Houthis who are not going to 
step out from the game without “order from Teheran” or real safeguards from coalition side, 
which in theory must ensure the stop of bombardment as the primary requirement. Saudis and 
coalition have used different methods of coercion, including bombing and use of 
indiscriminate weapons even against civilians, naval blockade and sanctions, however, no one 
have worked efficiently to have a final solution of the conflict via military methods resulting 
in state guiltiness for alleged war crimes. It can be said that inefficiency of used military 
methods has contributed towards political dialogue, because military methods have depleted 
in their essence.  
Holding indiscriminate attacks in face of airstrikes and use of cluster munitions has promoted 
concerns from both international community and international organisations. In other words, 
some external factors have definitely affected Saudi and other coalition authorities, and all 
coalition vision on feasibility of the intervention and necessity to do something completely 
illegal, even if it was non-intentional. For instance, UN has accorded attention to international 
community on the situation in Yemen, that it “must stop turning a blind eye to these 
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violations”[and the intolerable humanitarian situation], and turn to cooperation path.146 
Obviously, coalition authorities, particularly, Saudis, has rejected the idea of cooperation, 
because they most likely understand their failure and their “involvement” in violating legal 
obligations, which in consequence may raise towards real criminal responsibility. Its part in 
possible establishment of dialogue and long-term ceasefire also plays the recent investigation 
of arms sales to Saudi-Arabia from UK and US.
147
 Of course, topic of arms sales is an entirely 
different and broad matter to be discussed as the separate topic regarding Yemen conflict and 
even unlawfulness of such duties, however, it correlates with the current agenda in an implicit 
way. Arms sales is a matter for criticism not only to the sales party, but also to a buyer party 
in face of the Saudi Arabia and coalition. Here it can be speculated that wider criticism 
received to UK and US decisions to sale arms to Riyadh can be turned to the wider criticism 
of the military operations in Yemen by Saudi side. Arms sales case undermine the necessity to 
continue the operations, firstly, if already UK and US have been internally criticized being 
involved in the conflict, where their role in violations was substantial. Secondly, if UK and 
US are going to halt its arms sales in favour of transparency and cooperation with Houthis, 
Saudi Arabia can be pushed to stop airstrikes and military operations, because of the internal 
political pressure on the third side(US,UK) and lack of military resources to continue the 
intervention.   
Finally, it is questionable whether the existence of alleged violations and unlawful conduct 
can contribute towards political resolution of the conflict. It can be said that presence of 
alleged violations is more factor, but not the real reason, that may change the situation in a 
positive direction. Legal agenda is not always interdependent with political one, because 
different factors can affect both of them. The Yemen is not case, whether alleged violations 
may be perceived as  the tool for political resolution, because from one point, those are only 
alleged, and there have been no real investigation, established ad hoc tribunal on state 
responsibility with regard to the Yemen. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The thesis raises the issue, how the way to carry out military actions in particular conflict by 
multiple states ended up in broad negligence of internationally recognized standards of 
conducting war with a number of violations of law. The raised hypothesis in the beginning of 
the thesis maintains on the prediction that applicable law to non-international armed conflict 
explains the unlawfulness of conduct of Saudi-led coalition in Yemen through an assessment 
of alleged violations of law that occurred by using indiscriminate attacks towards the civilian 
population and civilian objects, and use of cluster munitions. It can be said that hypothesis is 
confirmed after the researching relevant applicable legal rules and observing the specific 
situations, together with assessment of criteria for considering the “presence” of the illegality 
of specific actions performed by the coalition. Moreover, the thesis hypothesised that there is 
a lack of connection between legal and political elements, more precisely, that alleged 
violations of IHL cannot act as a tool for excuse towards conflict resolution. The hypothesis 
can be affirmed respectively. To summarize, thesis analysed how the covering applicable 
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rules to non-international armed conflict, that is set to explain the nature of conduct by the 
particular party, fits with alleged violations related to the presence of indiscriminate attacks 
and indiscriminate weapons, as well as the reflection of the legal explanation of such attacks 
on the particular situations. 
To conclude the respective parts included in the paper, it is important first to 
summarize the theoretical part of the paper related to the assessment of political and legal 
framework. Analysis in the chapter has shown the complicated nature of the conflict itself, 
because there is a problematic aspect in a comprehensive approach, especially the number 
of legal sources and real facts, to indicate the type of conflict and applicable legal rules. Legal 
analysis that was used in the paper to stress on the affiliation of Yemen conflict to “unusual” 
type of non-international armed conflict, such as internationalized non-international armed 
conflict has no particular implications with regard to applicable law. It is merely theoretical 
and is used to clarify the unavailability of presence of other types of conflict in a particular 
case, in order not to confuse the reader about a large number of potential legal rules, that 
could be used for the analysis, if the type is not properly classified. Moreover, the chapter 
underlines the existence of the armed conflict in Yemen as such, by approaching legal criteria 
such as organisational element and level of intensity, therefore, it can be concluded that 
affiliation of Yemen conflict to armed conflict required the in-depth assessment of case-law, 
which was necessary to base the analysis on already existing practices. Furthermore, the 
chapter set emphasis on the status of approached military methods in the “practical” part of 
the analysis, such as indiscriminate attacks and indiscriminate weapons. It can be concluded, 
that both military methods are linked to each other, however, at the same time, both of them 
have a different purpose, when it comes to implementation of the legal rules. 
With regard to the second part of the thesis, it implies practical analysis of 
demonstration of unlawfulness of the actions performed by party in the specific situation 
through using indiscriminate attacks and indiscriminate weapons towards civilian population 
and civilian objects. Generally, it can be concluded that illegality of action may be proved 
even in the absence of the actual indiscriminate attacks, because such illegality is clarified and 
“affirmed” by the different elements. It is not good, because legal framework for 
indiscriminate attacks, when it is used in legitimate purposes or it causes incidental damage is 
very limited to rule 12 of CIHL, which can be rejected in simple way. However, as the result 
it does not change the status of illegality of the attack, that remained. Furthermore, it is 
important to conclude each case separately, and what are the potential implications for future 
researches. 
In steam power plant case the alleged violations became the real violations, because 
after applying legal rules it was considered that coalition has used indiscriminate attack 
directly and intentionally against the civilians, which in nature is unlawful and cannot be 
justified. With regard to cattle market case it can be concluded that coalition did not target 
civilians by the mean of indiscriminate attack, but the conduct still was illegal, because the 
fundamental principles of IHL have been violated, such as principle of distinction, principle 
of precaution and principle of proportionality. Concerning Amran factory case, it can be 
concluded that applicable law has explained the unlawful conduct differently, from one point 
it is in nature unlawful, if the use of prohibited weapons is taken in account, from the 
perspective of indiscriminate attack, incidental damage to civilian objects has been posed, that 
still was unlawful, but due to disrespect of fundamental principles. Basis on different 
circumstances of the conducts and use of different approaches of legal sources that are 
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applicable to explain the illegality, the possible implications on future researches base on such 
strict scope of the analysis can be the presence of uncertainty in legal sources and lack of legal 
rules that can explain illegality in more detailed way. The solution of the problem set in the 
paper substantially depends on the presence of applicable law that is capable to clarify certain 
conducts from legal perspective, and of course, the availability of sources and reports from 
the ground, where alleged violations are evidenced, because without such sources it is not 
possible to make clear analysis without speculating on the conditions of the conduct.  
With regard to political considerations, it can be concluded that political agenda fall 
outside the legal framework set in the paper, because the concerns on both agendas primarily 
are different in their nature. Some connecting factors still exist, such as decision-making 
process in taking military decisions that is somehow connected to performed conducts. 
Secondly, the external influence from international community may affect the coalition to 
stop air campaign in Yemen, however in reality international instruments were not effective to 
make an impact on state actions. Thirdly, the investigations, such as U.S-U.K arms sales may 
have certain impact on Saudi and coalition decisions, due to negative consequences both for 
sellers and for buyer.  
Finally, the recommendations for further researches on the same topic, would be the 
following ones. The assessment of violations of international humanitarian law always needs 
careful analysis of legal sources that are applicable to the specific types of conflict. It is right 
decision to turn to customary law instead of treaty law, if the treaty law does not specific 
aspect of analysed principle. Practical analysis of the situations is more complicated than it is 
foreseeable from the beginning, because it is essential to apply relevant legal sources together 
with analysing the facts of the situations in consistent and clear manner that is not always 
possible because of the significant number of sources that could be used. 
Author emphasizes on the importance of respective type of analysis for any situations 
in armed conflicts, where alleged violations took place constantly. It is relevant to make the 
agenda of international humanitarian law more approached, because in modern conflicts the 
lack of transparency is evidenced increasingly. 
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